What’s in a Name? India and America in the Twenty-First Century

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The turn of the century has seen a remarkable evolution in the quality of relations between India and America. Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee went so far as to declare the two countries to be ‘natural allies’, an evocative phrase often repeated by American officials and later reformulated as ‘strategic allies’ by US President George W. Bush in response to the expediencies of the war on terror. However, using the language of alliances can be damaging if it creates false expectations and produces misunderstandings. It raises the fear, to quote from the title of a illuminating study, of further disjunctures between ‘the hope and the reality’ of Indo-American relations.

Indeed, the most striking feature of the first 50 years of Indo-American relations is the extent to which relations suffered from such misunderstanding and ‘role strain’. Even before India had achieved independence in 1947, each side had already begun professing its distrust of the other’s intentions: the leaders of the Indian independence movement took President Franklin Roosevelt’s lack of resolve in pressuring British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the question of decolonisation as a sign of US complicity in the imperial project; while the American establishment simultaneously felt Indian pressure, especially the 1942 Quit India Movement, to be untimely since maintaining alliance relations were considered more important for the war effort. Unfortunately, this theme of larger systemic interests choking bilateral relations was to be replayed over much of the following half century. At the peak of Indo-American relations, for example, President John F. Kennedy strained to reconcile America’s idealist anti-colonial position with its need to support Portugal, a loyal member of NATO, in its

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confrontation with India over Goa. Simultaneously, he expressed disappointment at the Indian use of force, telling the then Indian Ambassador to the US, B.K. Nehru, that ‘you spent the last 15 years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave ... the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel’. Unable to coax Portugal into reason, America was then forced to single out India for criticism at the UN, leading Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to state – against his own conception of non-alignment – that ‘support for India is the acid test by which we can judge the policies of other countries’.

Another example of a damaging contradiction between norms and interests was provoked by the initiation of American military support for Pakistan in 1954, which ran counter to its stated desire to foster a ‘non-zero sum relationship’ with India and Pakistan. India was infuriated when alliance logic eventually led America to turn a blind eye toward Pakistan’s use of American weaponry against India in 1965 despite an American promise to prevent such ‘misuse’. This disjuncture between claim and reality was only further exacerbated by repeated American military transfers to Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, in violation of its own sanctions against the military dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq.

A third example was provided by President Lyndon Johnson’s appeal to the US Congress to apportion food aid for India. Deploying a liberal conception of world affairs, he asked: ‘can we let it be said that man, who can travel to space and explore the stars, cannot feed his own?’ He went on to add ‘that it is not in our nature to drive hard mathematical bargains where hunger is involved’. Within a few months, however, India’s unceasing criticism of American involvement in Vietnam had led Johnson to reconsider the mathematics of malnutrition and he personally arranged for a ‘ship-to-mouth’ or short-tether food policy, which Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured his local ambassador as being ‘solely the result of our grave misgivings regarding past performance and present plans of the Government of India for increased food production’.

A converse example of ‘hypocrisy’ came toward the latter half of the Cold War when the Indian government chose to abstain from a UN General Assembly Resolution 3737 (1982) condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in sharp contrast to its stance against imperialism. This was the second prominent instance when India’s ‘double-standard’ and ‘un-neutral neutralism’ came under scathing public attack in America – the first had been after India had criticised the Western powers over the Suez crisis in 1956 but chosen to remain silent over the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary in the same year and of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The antagonism, Selig Harrison writes, was only deepened because ‘Indian leaders contributed to this central perceptual problem by seeking to cloak the realpolitik character of non-alignment in sanctimonious rhetoric’.10

The historical record, therefore, seems to speak unambiguously of disillusionment since the contrast between prescribed identities and actual interests ‘made it impossible for the United States to live up to its moral billing in Indian eyes, and, conversely, for India to live up to its moral billing in American eyes ... both sides [had come] into the relationship expecting too much of each other’.11 This historical record should be remembered as we consider whether the two sides currently have a commonality of interests that justifies the identity that they have ascribed to each other in recent years.

**Great expectations**

Indian and American officials have spoken warmly about the normative dimension of the relationship, emphasising the affinity of core values in both societies. The normative dimension, however, seems ill-equipped to undergird an alliance: though the intrinsic commonality of values provides an important moral underpinning to the relationship between the two countries, it is not clear how this should translate in policy terms. ‘India’s democracy’, as former Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan infamously commented in light of the suspension of democracy during the 1975 Emergency, ‘was the one claim that they had on us ... when India ceased to be a democracy, our actual interests there just plummeted. I mean, what does it export but communicable diseases?’12 Democracy returned and thrived in subsequent years, but this did little to help the relationship in the following decade as America’s involvement in Afghanistan brought it unfortunately close to Pakistan.

The problem then, if it could be called that, is the mutual feeling that the relationship between the world’s most powerful democracy and the world’s largest democracy should be somehow special; however, it is unclear where this leads, beyond a sense of American awe at how the entire system holds together in the Indian context.13 The dilemma, in short, is that there is no discernable common *external* threat to the values of either society that would warrant an ‘ideological’ alliance. While both countries are committed to fighting the ‘the forces of fundamentalism’, the perceived threats to the values of
both societies emerge from remarkably dissimilar locations. India considers Pakistan’s religious nationalism to be the greatest threat to its own multicultural polity, while America considers a panoply of primarily Islamic developing states, including Iran, Syria, Sudan and Iraq, to be a source of threat to its own values. Each country maintains significant links with the ideological combatants of the other. Indeed, their flexibility in dealing with non-democracies leaves them incapable of forming any substantial ideological alliance against such countries.

This problem is reflected in the significant discrepancy between the voting practices of India and America at the UN. For example, in the period 1995–2000, the highest level of voting coincidence between India and the US did not exceed 23.1% in any given year and averaged 20.5% (and if one included issues on which either party abstained then the figure is likely to be even lower). In 1999, this track record placed India on a list of 16 countries that voted less than 25% of the time with the US, including at least ten non-democracies. This compares adversely with America’s closest allies, such as Israel and the United Kingdom – both of whom voted alongside the US more than 90% of the time. In 2001–03, India and America’s voting coincidence did not rise above 22% and averaged approximately 20%.

The discrepancy between India and America remains when one considers their voting patterns on issues deemed as ‘important’ by the US State Department: the use of economic sanctions; the enforcement of human rights; global environmental and trade standards; the future of Palestine and the Middle East; and the pursuit of arms control. Their voting coincidence on such important issues was 27.3% in 1997, 14.3% in 1998, 44.4% in 1999, 22.2% in 2000, 0% in 2001, 30% in 2002 and 23% in 2003. When strategic abstentions are taken into account, then their voting coincidence falls to 23% in 1997, 10% in 1998, 30% in 1999, 18% in 2000, 0% in 2001, 21% in 2002 and 20% in 2003.

For example, in the case of economic sanctions India has consistently voted to censure the US embargo of Cuba and has urged it to repeal extraterritorial laws such as the Helms-Burton Act. It also voted against the US in 1995 and 1997 on resolutions calling for the ‘elimination of coercive economic measures’ and was the first country to violate the trade sanctions against Iraq. On the matter of human rights, India has repeatedly opposed or abstained from supporting a number of American-sponsored resolutions censuring Iran, Cuba, Sudan, Iraq and Balkan states for human-rights abuses, leading in one particularly bad year – 1998 – to 0% coincidence with America on human-rights issues. On developmental issues, America has fended off a series of a resolutions introduced by G-77 states, and supported by India, including
the assertion in 1997 and 1998 that there is a ‘right to development’ and in 2000 that ‘globalisation affects, and interferes with the enjoyment of, human rights’. In opposition to the arguments presented by the developing world, the US has summed up its basic disagreement by arguing that ‘while a human-rights based approach adds to development policy, the reverse, a development-based approach to human rights, has added neither to development nor to human rights’. In the case of the Middle East, India’s growing bilateral ties with the US and Israel have been restrained by its geostrategic interests in maintaining good relations with the OPEC countries, as well as its support for the Palestinian cause. It has consistently opposed both parties on nearly every General Assembly vote relating to the Palestinian problem, and between 2000 and 2004 it averaged only a 9% voting coincidence with America on issues concerning the Middle East. Finally, the issue of nuclear weapons remains the leading source of Indo-US friction as India continues to demand that the nuclear powers work towards reducing nuclear danger through time-bound disarmament mechanisms, rather than through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India considers open-ended and inherently discriminatory. This sampling of formal differences, while hiding important subtleties in negotiations within and outside formal institutions, nevertheless reflects the basic positional dissimilarities in the interests of India and America. Indeed, if anything, the conflicts of interests are exacerbated – not reduced – by their being democracies where politicians must respond to vocal constituencies.

**Geostrategic bottlenecks**

If values fail to provide India and America with common substantive interests then the foundation of their alliance will have to rest on common interests in countering shared threats.

China represents one such potential threat to both countries. India’s relationship with China has been dominated by conflict. If a parallel conflicts is inevitable in the Sino-American future, there might be a case for an Indo-American alliance directed towards balancing China. The possibility of an alliance is strengthened by assertions such as those in the report of *The Commission on America’s National Interests*, which states that ‘preventing the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Asia is one of America’s five vital interests’. Some Indian analysts have even pointed toward the quiet Indo-American strategic cooperation during and after the 1962 Sino-Indian war as a precedent for an alliance directed against a hostile China.
However, American interest in an anti-Chinese alliance is far from obvious. Instead, significant American attention is focused on positively influencing Chinese intentions. As Zbigniew Brzezinski notes: ‘the real strategic challenge for the United States pertains to China’s evolution, both in its domestic politics and especially with regard to the global mindset of its ruling elite’. Consequently, the presently ambiguous American position of seeking to balance engagement and containment provides little durable ground upon which to build a sustained alliance.

India too is likely to be hesitant to sacrifice its policy of non-alignment in favour of entangling alliances, which historically it has avoided. One recent study has highlighted India’s emphasis on self-reliance. This strategy, argues Ashley J. Tellis, is predicated on India’s assumption that its ‘best insurance against an assertive Chinese power lies not in participating in any evolving anti-China alliance but rather in emerging as a strong and independent power center’. Instead of engaging in external balancing, Kanti Bajpai argues that India may well continue pursuing a ‘modified’ structuralism that has traditionally allowed it to make expedient tactical allowances in order to safeguard its cherished autonomy. His analysis suggests that power inequalities have forced India to ‘combine coercive with accommodative strategies as a way of compensating for its weaknesses’, including the pursuit of diplomatic normalisation and summitry. Another author sees the relationships between China, India and America as essentially triangular: ‘each country will try to form partnerships with the others where their interests coincide, mobilize support against unacceptable initiatives by the other, and prevent the two from forming an alliance against’. The challenge for the three countries in this ‘romantic triangle’, according to Harry Harding, will be to serve as the pivot in the relationship by exploiting tensions between the other two. India, being the weakest of the three, will likely face repeated opportunities to take advantage of this triangle though such a ‘conning’ strategy would certainly place a question mark over the utility of openly allying with either side.

An Indo-American alliance directed against Pakistan is even unlikelier than one directed against China. Traditionally, conflict over bilateral relations vis-à-vis Pakistan has been responsible for souring relations because American aid to Pakistan has been seen as enhancing that country’s ability to restrict India’s position to one of primacy – rather than hegemony – in the South Asian region and thus constricting its
broader strategic ambitions. The greatest challenge to any future Indo-American alliance lies in the growing realisation that proliferation concerns have dramatically – perhaps permanently – enhanced America’s stake in the stability of the Pakistani state. In contrast to the ‘geostrategic rents’ that Pakistan’s geographic position earned it during the Cold War, Pakistan’s military will now seek to earn ‘scare rents’ leveraged on the threat posed by regime collapse or state failure. In light of recent revelations about nuclear safety, a nervous Washington is also likely to be forced to rely on the Pakistani Army – the only institution capable of stabilising Pakistan – to maintain control over Pakistan’s nuclear scientists, infrastructure and materials. Christopher de Bellaigue recognises precisely this when he writes ‘that before September 11, [President] Musharraf’s largest problem was that he was a dictator. Now it’s his biggest asset’. However, there is a limit to how far the army can be pushed without a sufficient number of carrots. As a former US ambassador to Pakistan Dennis Kux notes: ‘the danger in Pakistan is not of an Iranian-style revolution in which the army disintegrates, but of the army bending to street power’. This emerging concern for – and dependence upon – the Pakistani military will place new restrictions on the US, since Washington’s need to maintain the legitimacy of the pre-eminent Pakistani institution is likely to create a significant moral hazard, exploitable by Pakistan’s military.

Given the revisionist logic that legitimises the role of the army in Pakistan, its continuing pre-eminence will likely draw the United States into a number of high-tension scenarios as Pakistan tests India’s resolve on Kashmir and seeks to undermine the foundations of its multicultural polity. Commentators who think that India should ‘logically’ be supportive of American efforts to stabilise Pakistan fail to recognise that this so-called stabilisation will likely be undertaken at the cost of sacrificing India’s core security interests, particularly via pressure to reward the Pakistani army through concessions vis-à-vis Kashmir. While Pakistan’s stabilisation is undoubtedly in India’s national security interest, it would be short-sighted to assume that any and every expedient mode of stabilisation will be welcome to India. It remains unclear to India’s strategic elite why its core interests should serve as fodder for a belated American effort to solve the ‘Pakistan problem’.

In these circumstances, a constructive role for the US will be limited to encouraging nuclear risk-reduction and sharing strategic information to prevent any deterioration in the region’s precarious strategic balance. Consequently, there is a substantial concern that America’s subsequent role in propping up the Pakistani state, especially in its current militarised form, will only fuel resentment in India. Nevertheless, what
India must realise is that Pakistan, by virtue of its character and its possession of nuclear weapons, has become a poster-child of the Westphalian order, since the entire international system has a stake in its survival. India, therefore, is very unlikely to receive much support from America, and at best can pray that the international community will ultimately move to disarm Pakistan rather than succumb to its ‘threat to fail’. Safely supposing otherwise, India has already begun to elucidate autonomous strategies by invoking a doctrine for limited war as well as enhancing its defence expenditure. Indeed, after the deeply provocative 13 December 2001 attack on India’s parliament by Pakistan-based militants, India has placed this new high-risk strategy on display in an effort to signal its willingness to act autonomously in defence of the national interest.

**International disorder**

Beyond the complexities of geostrategic interests, a number of studies have highlighted the maintenance of international regimes as a common interest shared by both countries, thus potentially opening an avenue for cooperation. Theorists such as Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane point to American-sponsored multilateral regimes as an example of a vital exercise of soft power which they define (in contradistinction to hard power) as ‘the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want. It is the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion’. Yet, from an Indian perspective, it is implausible that the US hegemon can pull the rabbit of legitimacy out of the hat of dominance. This Indian perspective is not hard to fathom; it derives from the vastly different positions occupied by India and America in the international order. India, for its part, sees itself as leading a coalition of developing countries that make demands for equitable treatment in multilateral forums. To be sure, in India’s worldview an equitable world order is not one without hierarchy – rather, it is one respectful of demographic, economic, civilisational and (to a lesser degree) military force. India therefore feels deeply aggrieved by what it perceives to be America’s unwillingness to recognise the Indian claim for due consideration. This demand for recognition derives from India’s self-image and is more than a cosmetic demand for a seat at this or that table. It is instead a revisionist demand for a reordering of the international system – though this is unorthodox revisionism characterised by moral rather than military pressure. This claim for international distributive justice is a critical and inescapable part of the modern Indian identity, and it would take a tremendous blindness to ignore its central role in modern Indian foreign policy. It is not surprising, then, that India has responded to
international neglect by accelerating the development of the orthodox capabilities required for elevation to great power status.

Various political disputes are magnified into ‘status’ issues. This is most obvious in continuing American efforts to contain the Indian nuclear and missile programme. India refuses to accede to what it perceives as an inequitable international nuclear regime framework, and in the absence of an equitable global disarmament agreement, is certain to continue climbing the ladder of weaponisation.43 America will therefore be faced with two policy options: either it can continue its policy of denial or it can formally recognise India’s capabilities and include it in – rather than target it with – multilateral regimes. This would eliminate a major impediment to relations by removing the need for what Gaurav Kampani terms a ‘show-and-tell’ policy that forces America to confront India’s strategic evolution ex post facto, which is unpleasant for both parties.44 The current efforts to resolve the contradiction between global non-proliferation norms and bilateral pressures for accommodation by coaxing India to pursue a limited deterrent will eventually fail, as it is most unlikely that New Delhi will offer Washington a pre-emptive veto on future weapons developments. Indeed, to try and contain Indian autonomy in this area would only aggravate the problem, since India arguably desires a credible triadic capability precisely to deter any intervention in the region that goes against its core interests and to prevent nuclear blackmail by any foreign power.45

A second arena of disagreement concerns the future of international regimes currently under construction. Beyond global trade agreements – where India has played a pivotal role in organising opposition to the United States – the discordant views extend further to encompass a range of human security issues, including those related to the management of the global commons. One source of friction is the conflict between American corporations and developing countries, including India, who remain wary of commercialising development-related aspects of food, health and ecological security.46 India and America also have sharply divergent views on the principles that should govern the distribution of costs and responsibilities for reducing environmental damage. The countries of the South, led by India, argue that the Northern countries – as historical beneficiaries of environmental exploitation – must shoulder a disproportionate burden of the costs associated with reducing environmental degradation.47 They cite, for example, the enormous disparity between the two countries’ per capita emissions, which in 1999 stood at 19.7 tonnes and 1.1 tonne respectively – a divergence which
implies that every American contributes almost as much as 19 Indians.\textsuperscript{48} The current standoff over the Kyoto Protocol is bound to create further conflict as it leaves America free to pollute without having any formal commitments to invest in Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) or provide compensation for the impact of climate change which disproportionately affects developing countries such as India that rely on natural resource industries.\textsuperscript{49}

The countries of the South further argue that the Northern countries, particularly the United States, must share the burden of producing an egalitarian and sustainable pattern of global resource consumption, so as to provide the developing world with ‘space to develop’. India, for example, with its growing population and rising income levels, will need cheap and plentiful access to resources in order to develop. This ambition will likely prove unaffordable and materially impossible unless the US accommodates India’s growth by reducing its own absolute consumption of renewable resources such as fish, forests and energy, which in 2001 was 12 times India’s consumption level.\textsuperscript{50} By contrast, the developed countries, led by the United States, are seeking binding global commitments that would require all countries to alter their consumption patterns simultaneously, thus locking in current inequalities in absolute consumption as well as denying the developing countries (through ‘Green Imperialism’) the consumption patterns that the North historically utilised to develop and modernise. The basic dispute – and the unstated implications for a developing country with great power aspirations – could not be starker.

**Still pending**

Hopes in the late 1990s of more intimate Indo-American ties were founded on the premise of the continuing expansion and liberalisation of the Indian economy, which if it grew at a sustained rate of 7% per annum, would become the world’s fourth largest economy by 2020. This economic dynamism would yield two strategically significant outcomes in regard to India’s relationship with America: first, it would provide India with an economic foundation for its broader foreign policy ambitions, which by enhancing the external and internal dimensions of national security, would enhance India’s utility as an alliance partner. Second, the shift in Indian strategy for growth, from internal self-reliance to external orientation, would enhance interdependence and interpenetration between the Indian and American economies.\textsuperscript{51}

However, the optimistic forecasts held out for an Indo-American partnership based on such economic growth have proven unfounded. First, American exports have had little success in penetrating Indian markets.
As a prominent Indian writer puts the problem – ‘what sells in the United States is how much you buy from the United States’. Bilateral trade, for example, has risen by almost 100% from $5.7 billion in 1995 to $10.7 bn in 2000. Meanwhile, American imports have stagnated at the $3–4bn mark. American exports constitute just over 10% of Indian imports and just 0.6% of America’s total exports, which makes India the United States’ twenty-fifth largest commercial partner. The former US ambassador, Robert D. Blackwill, said in a 2002 public address that the trend for American exports to India was ‘as flat as a chapatti’. India’s own exports are strategically unimportant, given their concentration in consumer industries and the easy availability of alternative suppliers (unlike monopolistic oil suppliers, for example). They might, in fact, even be a source of tension given that 70% of India’s exports are concentrated in sectors such as textiles, steel and agriculture that have traditionally enjoyed protection in America.

Second, the leading example of economic synergy of the two countries – IT-enabled outsourcing – has produced mixed sentiments. The seeming attrition of white-collar jobs in the US has begun to produce a political backlash. While the data suggests that the labour market impact of outsourcing is presently limited, this may grow over time, especially in the United States, which does not invest in retraining labour. Subsequently, there are fears that the resentment may transform into an active form of protectionism.

Third, India’s low demand for imports apart, the American interest in the Indian economy has also been expressed via the foreign direct investment route. India is ranked second after China in terms of current and potential market size – two important determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness – thus leading the State Department to categorise it as a Big Emerging Market (BEM). Yet, interpenetration has remained low. As Blackwill notes, in 1995, US investment in India was $192 million; in 1996, $255m; in 1997, $737m; in 1998, $347m; in 1999, $431m; and in 2000, US investment in India totalled $336m. Perhaps even more telling is that US firms ended up investing only 38% of that approved by the government of India. This is perhaps mostly due to a number of institutional deficiencies that have resulted in India being usually ranked at the bottom end by the Global Competitiveness Report. In 1999, it was fifty-second out of 59 countries, rising to thirty-seventh out of 65 countries in 2003.

There is also an amorphous, though powerful, obstacle in the form of the Indian political environment. One such example is provided by the rhetoric of economic sovereignty (‘the East India Company Syndrome’) which draws on deep reservoirs of nationalist history and carries
enormous political weight that no democratically elected government can ignore, especially when attempting to pursue privatisation or encourage foreign investment in ‘sensitive’ sectors. This has resulted in restrictions being placed on foreign direct investment in sectors such as insurance, telecommunications, airports and airlines.

Besides, the future of the domestic reform process is itself far from certain. The post-Independence modern Indian state sustained its legitimacy through vast patronage networks and this past experience has left the newer rule-based system vulnerable to the Russian-style manipulation by oligarchs and powerful interest groups. In sum, a number of macroeconomic, sectoral and microeconomic reforms are necessary to reorient the Indian economy toward a high-growth track, but there is little consensus on how quickly or effectively these urgent reforms can be implemented. Moreover, the first round of reforms was arguably the easier ones, which focused on matters that were of special concern to elites (such as equity and external market reforms) or could be pursued through obfuscation and subterfuge. In sharp contrast, the necessary future reforms affect visible sectors of the economy and are likely to encounter stiff opposition from both coalition allies and opposition parties.

Finally, there has also been little multilateral or bilateral progress in resolving disputes relating to trading rules. Despite evidence to show that trade liberalisation does not lead to a race to the bottom in regulatory standards and that the content of a ‘social standards clause’ is best administered by pre-existing institutions such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), domestic pressure for protectionism has led the US into direct conflict with developing countries, including India, that demand the right to abide by standards that they can ‘afford’ given their current level of economic development. Subsequently, proposals for a radical transformation in trade relations via a US–India Free Trade Agreement (USINTA) have not moved beyond the drawing board.

Why history matters
A quarter-century ago, an eminent Indian observer warned his American audience about the capacity for conflict between democracies when he borrowed from George Bernard Shaw, remarking that if England and America are two countries separated by the same language then India and America are two countries separated by the same political system. The purpose of this article has been to outline this often stark contrast between the principles, interests and policies espoused by India and America. The foundation for their deepest and most enduring differences, it has been suggested, arise from the very different positions that India and America occupy in the international system: India is an
unorthodox revisionist power with great power aspirations; America is a status quo power that is partial to unilateralism. Recognising this does not undermine the importance of diplomacy in managing these differences. However, process is different from policy and what this article has tried to identify – at a remove from the nitty-gritty of everyday diplomacy – is the nature of the conflicting principles that trouble relations between the two countries.

Three strategic opportunities presented by this context give reason to be cautiously optimistic about how the two countries may come to have more interests in common. First, a distinct long-term possibility is that a growing common threat to the two countries will allow them to submerge their differences. For India, the American fear of a rising China might provide the opportunity to make its bid for a global role. Alternatively, as joint Sino-American criticism following the publication of a draft nuclear doctrine revealed, prematurely raising one’s head too high, too soon, remains imprudent.

Second, a medium-term domain of positive cooperation lies in the growing interpenetration of the service economies of both countries. In order to capitalise on this opportunity India will have to display the political will required to undertake the necessary reforms, while America will have to show the political will necessary to produce a viable trade agreement. Increasing economic interdependence provides the most durable foundation for a relationship that is not predicated on the presence of a common external threat. This encompasses not just commercial transactions, but also pertains to a broader set of social linkages arising from educational links, media and entertainment interests, and human migration. The widely noted achievements of India’s successful immigrant community in the United States and their continuing links with India provide another important source of interpenetration. Previously benign social linkages are now being transformed into political networks and promise both countries additional channels of influence and persuasion. These are deep and profound factors of change that will do much, hopefully, to bring the interests of the two countries – via a closer association of their citizens – into greater harmony.

Third, a short-term goal for the two countries should be a further deepening of the consultative or community features in their relationship through greater intergovernmental cooperation that, depending on the personalities involved, may allow for a greater appreciation of mutual constraints. There is space, in other words, for more nudging and more winking. Tactical cooperation, especially the intelligence sharing witnessed during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, has already created a precedent for enhanced security coordination on a case-by-case basis.
Meanwhile growing inter-agency cooperation and military coordination between the two sides, both of which were given an enormous boost by the personal interest of former Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, should help to insulate communication channels from political upheavals. Finally, the recent reaffirmation of a ‘Strategic Partnership Initiative’ directed at cooperation on a ‘quartet’ of vital issues – nuclear energy, civil space technology, high-technology trade and missile defence – is a valuable development that expands technical links and lays the foundation for joint investment in critical sectors.

What has to be guarded against, meanwhile, is miscommunication. Using the language of alliances to describe a relationship that – despite good intentions – is fraught with tension exacerbates this risk. One might respond that there is no immediate harm in terming each other as allies because the purpose of rhetoric, after all, is to persuade. The potential cost to such a rhetorical strategy seems minimal because the two countries can recover each time from their previous disillusionment by shrugging off the past. However, the troubled history of Indo-American relations bears ample witness to the costs arising from such confounded expectations. Today, for example, four years after former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s unparalleled efforts to bring India and America closer together, Pakistan has been formally recognised as a major non-NATO American ally. This seems to many like history repeating itself, though admittedly improved communication channels have reduced the sting of this disappointment.

Nevertheless, it is possible to see how repeated contradiction between stated intentions and actual outcomes can undermine trust on both sides – with each disappointment adding to the fund of suspicion and hostility. This is not to say that the language of alliances is completely unwarranted. It can help in signalling positive intentions, but it must be used with care and preparation in order to prevent a mismatch between words and deeds. This will prove a particularly important task for the new Congress-led coalition government, which must exceed the Bharatiya Janata Party’s only achievement in office – a relatively prudent approach to managing foreign policy in an era of coalition politics.

Yet, for all the advice given to either side the choice between optimism and pessimism about the relationship rests on a single question. That is, regardless of the presence or absence of common enemies, does America consider the emergence of a strong, liberal democratic India to be in its interest? There is, unfortunately, no clear answer to this question. A number of arguments could be made, of course, for why a temperate accommodation of India is in America’s enlightened self-interest. India, for example, could provide a multilateral American policing strategy with enormous legitimacy by bringing the moral weight of a fifth of humanity
to bear on global issues. The success of their cooperative endeavours in commerce, academia and technology is a second argument. The commonality of their values as enshrined in their respective constitutions provides a third argument. But the logic of states is not usually the pursuit of values, or even enlightened self-interest. Instead the relationship between India and America is better summed up by the famous story in St Augustine’s *City of God* where Alexander confronts an insolent pirate. When the great king asks him what he means by infesting the sea, the pirate defiantly replies: ‘The same as you do when you infest the whole world; but because I do it with a little ship I am called a robber, and because you do it with a great fleet you are an emperor’. 76

In short, the emergence of a powerful India will require American sacrifices. However, there is a fear that those sacrifices, on trade, environmental and security issues for example, will not come voluntarily. Will America penalise India for pressing these claims in the future – as it did following India’s nuclear weapons test in 1998? Unlike the story of Alexander and the pirate, containing India can only come at a substantial cost to America’s own moral identity. That is, after all, one of the reasons the British finally surrendered their treasured colony – felled by the egalitarian logic of ideas they considered theirs but India made its own. Thus, to belittle the principles underlying modern India’s foreign policy as those belonging to a ‘moralistic, contrarian loner’ in the international system because it seeks to defend its national interest by overturning – rather than acceding to – a world order manifestly ridden with inequity does little to understand India’s ambition. 77

This ambition is made especially potent because on the one hand India’s pursuit of its interests is made stronger by the fact that it has justice on its side, while its pursuit of justice is made fervent by having interest on its side. On the other hand the essentially peaceful, cosmopolitan and democratic nature of India’s polity prevents a convenient demonisation. Like China, India has been created out of bitter indignation and while this has made it neither cunning nor fierce like its northern neighbour – it has given it a stubborn resolve. The future of Indo-American relations, in the broadest sense then, hinges upon understanding the character of this historically unique challenge. How America should subsequently respond is easier to preach than it is to predict how it will actually respond. But whether it responds to this challenge constructively or negatively will ultimately determine the nature of relations between these two unusual giants.
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Notes
1 A summary of the deployment of this phrase can be found in Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (eds.), *The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 9.
13 Hess identifies the 1950s and 1960s as the period when India was viewed as the ‘essential democracy’ due to the widespread belief in the American establishment that the failure of Indian democracy would weaken the credibility of democracy in Asia. The phase passed with the initiation of the Sino-American rapprochement and India’s 1974 nuclear tests, and it was also hastened to a close by continuous bickering over America’s aid conditionalities and India’s socialist policies. See Hess, ‘American Perspectives on India: 1947–1990’, pp. 174–181.
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15 Data compiled from the US State Department Annual Report on Voting Practices in the UN series (hereafter UNVP). These are available online at http://www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprac/.

16 UNVP, 2000, p. 36.


21 For an overview of Indo-Israeli relations see P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‘Indian-Israeli Relations: Humble Beginnings, A Bright Future’, report published by The American Jewish Committee, 6 May 2002, available online at http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/PublicationsPrint.asp?did=512 and Martin Sherman, ‘From Conflict to Convergence’, The Jerusalem Post, 28 February 2003. While the incoming Congress government is unlikely to alter the valuable decade-long expansion of ties with Israel, broader political and normative constraints are likely to hinder the transformation of this valuable rapprochement into an overt alliance. Instead, triangulation – which is already an important change from India’s Cold War policy toward Israel – will likely be the predominant feature for the foreseeable future. This is usefully highlighted in Sushil J. Aaron, Straddling Faultlines: India’s Foreign Policy toward the Greater Middle East, Occasional Paper 7, Centre de Sciences Humanies, New Delhi, 2003. Also see India Plays Both Sides in the Middle East, South Asia Monitor, no. 28, 1 December 2000.


28 Kanti Bajpai, ‘India: Modified Structuralism’, in Muthiah Alagappa


31 The phrase ‘geostrategic rents’ was coined by Devesh Kapur and discussed in his article ‘Quid Pro Quo: Aid for Pakistan, Not Its Army’, The Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 December 2001.


36 The management of the ensuing conditions of ‘ugly stability’ is discussed in Ashley J. Tellis, Nuclear Stability in South Asia, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000).

37 Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 29–32.


42 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.


45 For a hawkish view of India’s security requirements see Bharat Karnad,

46 On water shortages see Mark Strauss, ‘When Malthus meets Mendel’, Foreign Policy, no. 119, summer 2000.


49 A summary of these effects can be found in India Specific Impacts of Climate Change, Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi, 2001. For example, the rise in surface temperature due to global warming is calculated to reduce India’s agricultural revenues by 12% and negatively affect industries based on forestry – both sectors together constitute a third of its GDP and employ two-thirds of its labour force. A rise in oceanic water levels is also expected to cause extensive flooding of low-lying areas including Mumbai, the country’s financial centre.


55 For an overview of India’s IT successes see Devesh Kapur, ‘The Causes and Consequences of India’s IT Boom’, India Review, vol. 1. no. 2, April, 2002. A comprehensive archive of the debate on outsourcing can be found on the website of the South Asian Journalists Association (SAJA) at http://www.saja.org/outourcing.html. See, for example, Justin Fox, ‘Bangalore: Where Your Job is Going’, Fortune, 24 November 2003. For an opposing view see


67 An admirable analysis of the long-term trends can be found in Ashley J. Tellis, ‘China and India in Asia’, in Frankel and Harding. He notes that America will need to manoeuvre between partnering with China in the medium term to solve some of East Asia’s more intractable disputes and partnering with India in the long term to balance China. Also see Gautam Adhikari, ‘India and America: Estranged No More’, Current History,
April 2004, pp. 161–163, which discusses American views on strategic cooperation with India against China. Differences between the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense on this subject are also addressed.


69 Kapur, ‘Causes and Consequences’.

70 For example, Indian students now comprise the largest segment of the overseas student population in the United States. See the *Open Doors 2002-03 Report*, Institute of International Education, New York, 2003.


73 I am grateful to Pratap Mehta for making this point clearer to me.

74 A summary of some key developments can be found in Robert D. Blackwill, US Ambassador to India, ‘The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship’, *A Speech by the US Ambassador to India*, Indian Chamber of Commerce, Kolkata, India, 27 November 2002.

75 It is widely recognised that Brajesh Mishra, India’s first national security advisor, was the sagacious figure behind numerous positive developments during this period. See, for example, Jim Hoagland, ‘Behind the Surprise in India’, *Washington Post*, 16 May 2004. Hoagland’s concern at Mishra’s departure shows, however, the need for greater interaction between India’s foreign policy elites and their international counterparts. A deepening of such linkages would serve to de-emphasise the importance of personality (which is of course important in many other respects) and provide greater assurances of broad continuity in foreign policy.
